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Summary 
This paper discusses the impact of recent pension reform (including the conventional early leavers’ 
scheme) and reform of the general unemployment scheme on the development of sustainability as 
well as adequacy in Belgium. The impact analyses in this paper have been done using two separate 
yet consistent models. The analysis of the budgetary impact is based on the MALTESE system of 
models. The analysis of the adequacy of social security reform is done using the most recent version of 
the dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS. 
The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 percentage point 
of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed between pensions, unemployment and CELS/UCA. 
Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased GDP that results from the reform 
of course decreases the weight of the social expenses in percent of GDP.  
The risk of poverty rate of retirees decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the 
reduction reaches 4 percentage points (4 percentage points for the men and 5 percentage points for the 
women).Furthermore, the poverty risk of especially male unemployed increases considerably. 
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1. Introduction 
For many western countries, population ageing constitutes an important budgetary and social 
challenge. They – including Belgium – are therefore taking measures to deal with the issue. The 
Belgian governmental agreement of December 2011 included a social security reform which came into 
force in 2012 for certain aspects. 
The aim of these measures is primarily to strengthen the sustainability of the first-pillar pension 
system, especially through limiting early retirement. However, such a series of measures inevitably 
also has consequences on the adequacy of pension benefits in the first pillar. The question then is how 
important these impacts are.  
This paper aims to discuss the impact of recent social security reform on the development of 
sustainability as well as adequacy in Belgium. It is based on the most recent report of the Study 
Committee for Ageing (High Council of Finance 2012), for which the team “Social protection, 
demography and prospective” of the Federal Planning Bureau produces and simulates the various 
scenarios. 
The impact analyses in this paper have been done using two separate yet consistent models. The 
analysis of the budgetary impact of pension reform (including the conventional early leavers’ scheme) 
and general unemployment scheme is based on the MALTESE system of models, which is a 
composition of accounting models used to translate demographic and economic projections into 
budgetary developments. The analysis of the adequacy of social security reform is done using the most 
recent version of the dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS. This model simulates the lives of 
actual individuals and households in Belgium, starting from a representative administrative sample of 
about 2.2 million individuals in 2001. A discerning character of MIDAS is that it aligns to the 
simulation results of MALTESE. Consistency between the two models is achieved through various 
channels, previously described in Dekkers, Inagaki and Desmet (2012), which will be outlined.  
The paper will report on the results of this joint analysis of recent social security reform in Belgium. 
Thus, the projected budgetary impacts will be discussed along with the impact on the evolutions of the 
adequacy of pensions and unemployment benefits in Belgium. The former will focus on the labour 
market, the macro-economic environment and the social expenditures. The latter uses social indicators 
like poverty risks, inequality and (re)distribution indicators for the population as well as for specific 
groups. 
This introduction ends with the discussion of a caveat. Besides pension reform, the Di Rupo 
administration has also introduced a.o. reform in the unemployment and career break schemes. See 
High Council of Finances (2012, pp. 44-46) for an extended discussion. These of course also have 
their budgetary impact which will be briefly presented in the dedicated section. But the impact of 
unemployment reform on the adequacy of pensions (and vice versa) is at best indirect, namely via 
changes of the poverty line, and via the impact of the unemployment benefit on the equivalent 
household income of pensioners – and hence only for households that contain both pensioners and 
unemployed. The former effect will obviously be considerably stronger than the latter and this will 
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distort the comparison. To prevent this distortion, the impact of the reform of the pension system 
(including conventional early leavers’ scheme) is considered on the poverty risk of the pensioners 
only, while the impact of the reform of unemployment and career break schemes is expressed in terms 
of its impact on the poverty risk of the unemployed only.  
Section 2 of this paper concerns the description of the recent social security reform in Belgium. The 
two models used to estimate the budgetary and the social impact of the reform are presented in the 
third section. Section 4 illustrates the budgetary impact of the structural reforms while section 5 
analyses the social impact of the reforms.  
Seeing that the reform is very recent, there is not much work on the assessment of its consequences to 
date. A recent paper by Alain Jousten, Sergio Perelman, Fabio Sigismondi, and Ekaterina 
Tarantchenko (2012) is the most notable exception. This paper aligns with theirs in assessing the 
impact of reform on macroeconomic aggregates, but also on individuals. Furthermore, their 
microsimulation model and ours is based on essentially the same administrative dataset.  
Their work however differs in various respects from ours. First of all, they use static microsimulation 
techniques to express the impact of reform in ‘accrued to date pension rights’, i.e. the discounted 
pensions rights that would be due if the system were shut down today. This paper on the other hand 
uses dynamic macro modelling jointly with dynamic microsimulation to a forward-looking approach, 
taking into account the intertemporal impact of the reform and how reform changes “the future 
generosity of these programs” (Fernández, 2012, 78). Secondly, our approach is conceptually simpler 
in that we simulate the intertemporal development of the poverty risk of pensioners, respectively 
unemployed in a base scenario and its counterfactual. Third and most importantly, the above study 
chooses to “focus on a set of hypothetical reform scenarios rather than follow the reform as recently 
initiated by the Di Rupo government” (op. cit., 22), whereas our paper pertains to the budgetary and 
social impacts of recent actual social security reform.  
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2. Recent social security reform in Belgium 
Belgium has a Bismarckian-style first-pillar pension system, toned down by several floors, ceilings 
and a means-tested minimum pension benefit (an assistance scheme named the guaranteed income for 
the elderly). Besides this assistance scheme, there are three main separate schemes: wage earners (in 
the private sector as well as the contract employees in the public sector), civil servants and self-
employed.  
The last important pension reform was the reform of 1996 for wage earners and self-employed 
workers. It is dicussed in Festjens (1997) and aimed mainly at gradually increasing the retirement age 
of women (from 60 to 65 by 2009). Early retirement (from the age of 60) was submitted to a career 
condition of 35 years as from 2005. A "minimum claim per working year" was introduced in the wage 
earners’ scheme.  
Afterwards, the scheme of guaranteed income for elderly persons (GIEP) was reformed on 1 June 
2001 with the individualization of the allowance. The basic amount of the guaranteed income has been 
increased significantly since the reform of 2001. For instance, in an attempt to safeguard the adequacy 
of first-pillar pensions, the Leterme administration in 2006 increased the GIEP and the minimum 
claim per working year by about 14% (Whitehouse et al., 2009, 519). The impacts of these measures 
on pension adequacy and sustainability are discussed in De Vil et al. (2010) and Dekkers et al (2012) 
and therefore fall outside the scope of this paper.  
After a prolonged period of political stalemate, the Di Rupo administration in the law of December 
28
th
, 2011 introduced a number of measures on the reform of the first-pillar pension system, the 
unemployment scheme for older wage earners, and the general unemployment benefit system in 
Belgium
3
. According to the most recent projections of the Study Committee for Ageing of October 
2012, the budgetary costs of pensions
4
 without the recent reform would increase by 4.7% of GDP 
between 2011 and 2060. This together with an historical low participation rate of older people in 
Belgium, are the main motivations behind recent reforms.  
This section will discuss these measures, including a number of amendments and complements
5
. The 
next sections will then assess the impacts on the sustainability as well as adequacy of the first-pillar 
pension system (including CELS) and the unemployment system. 
Most OECD countries adopt three routes to reducing pension expenditures (OECD, 2012, 30; see also 
Whitehouse et al., 2009): reduced indexation of benefits, increased legal retirement age and tighter 
rules for early retirement. The first two pathways have not been taken (yet) in Belgium, and policy has 
focused on adapting the rules for calculating the benefit at retirement and reducing the possibilities for 
early retirement.  
                                                          
3  Despite the somewhat exceptional political circumstances, the timing of this reform as well as the arguments to legitimate it 
are broadly in line with the conclusions that Fernández (2012) draw on the basis of the study of pension retrenchments in 19 
OECD countries. 
4  Together with old age pensions, they also include survivor’s pensions, the GIEP and “availability before retirement” for 
teaching personnel. Pensions of public companies are also taken into account. 
5  Detailed transitional measures, even though included in the models, will not be discussed. They might however be 
mentioned later if relevant in explaining simulation results. 
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The discussion of pension reform in Belgium starts with the latter. Before 2013, early retirement was 
possible for wage earners and self-employed from 60 years with a career of at least 35 years. With the 
reform, this minimum age is gradually being increased by steps of 6 months per year, until reaching 62 
years in 2016. The minimum career length for early retirement also increases from 35 career years to 
38 career years in 2013, and then gradually by one extra career year per calendar year, until reaching 
40 career years in 2015. Before the reform, civil servants were not subject to an explicit career length 
condition for early retirement. The majority of them
6
 now become subject to the same conditions as 
wage earners and self-employed.  
The second pathway pertains to adapting the rules for calculating the benefit at retirement. The 
pension benefit a wage earner is entitled to at retirement is a function of the length of the career and 
the average uprated past earnings. Periods of inactivity due to unemployment, disability and illness, 
career breaks, conventional early leavers’ scheme (CELS; cf. infra) are taken into account – to a 
limited extent – as “equivalent periods”. These periods therefore are added to the length of the career. 
Since there by definition are no earnings for these periods, fictitious ‘equivalent’ earnings are used 
instead. Before 2013, these were the last earnings before becoming inactive, uprated with the price 
index. As a result of the 2013 reform, the equivalent earnings equal the minimum claim per working 
year for those that are long-term unemployed or some CELS. 
In the pension scheme for self-employed, a penalty reduces the pension benefit if the self-employed 
retires before the age of 65. Before 2013, a self-employed that retired at 60, the first age at which early 
retirement is possible, lost 25 percent of its pension benefit. If one retired at a later age, the penalty 
was lower, 18 or 12 percent. From 2013 on, this penalty is abandoned for those self-employed that are 
at least 63 or who have a long career in any pension system. Furthermore, for the others, the reduction 
tariff or penalty is reduced
7
. 
A first measure in the pension scheme for civil servants is a standardization of the categories that fall 
outside the general scheme. Before the reform, specific categories such as university professors, 
catholic priests and magistrates were subject to specific rules pertaining to the accrual rate of the 
pension benefit, or the number of career years after which the full retirement benefit was reached. 
These specific categories now fall under the general scheme, albeit still with a higher accrual rate.  
Secondly, since it pertains to all civil servants that have not reached the age of 50 on January 1
st
, 2012, 
the pension benefit is no longer based on the average earnings in the last 5 years before retirement, but 
on the last 10 years instead. This is so unless the pension benefit resulting from the latter wage-base 
falls under a predetermined minimum.  
Third and analogous to wage earners, the system of ‘equivalent periods’ in the pension scheme for 
civil servants is also changed. The general rule that equivalent periods may not exceed 20 or 25 
percent (depending on age) of the active periods is maintained. However, possibilities for equivalent 
                                                          
6  Specifically, this concerns civil servants in the regime “with tantième 1/60”. The other regimes of civil servants are also 
subject to reform, but with other transitional periods and career length conditions.  
7  The Di Rupo government has since then decided to abandon this penalty system altogether from 2014 on. As this was 
unknown at the time of implementing and simulating the reforms, the impact of this decision is not taken into account.  
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periods are extended for those of 50 and older. Finally, an overall cap of 5 years is introduced, except 
for thematic’ career breaks (parental leave, care for a serious ill relative and palliative care). 
In this paper, we consider the pension reform in a broad sense, including in it the reform of the 
“prépension” or conventional early leavers’ scheme (henceforth CELS). This is a full-time or part-time 
unemployment scheme for older wage earners of the private sector where recipients receive an 
additional benefit from the former employer equal at least to half of the gross unemployment benefit 
and the net earnings (subject to a cap) in the year prior to layoff. The 2012 reform changes the name of 
this system to “unemployment with company allowance” (henceforth UCA) and restricts the entry 
conditions of the system. There is one general system and various specific systems, including one 
system for restructuring companies. This paper will only briefly discuss reform in the former. 
Furthermore, discussion will be limited to the system of full time UCA, because the system of part-
time CELS is suppressed by the reform. Before the reform, the standard entry condition in CELS was 
a minimum age of 60 and a career length of at least 35 years for men, and 28 years for women, a 
condition which was gradually increasing to 35 years in 2028. For those with a long career of at least 
38 years, access to the CELS system was possible from the age of 58 on. As a result of the reform, the 
minimum age for entry into the UCA increased to 60 and the minimum career length goes up to 40 
years. Specific entry conditions for those with long careers are abolished.  
The unemployment scheme has also been reformed. This scheme discerns three categories of 
unemployed: cohabiting with dependants ("chômeurs cohabitants avec charge de famille"), cohabiting 
(without dependants; “chômeurs cohabitants sans charge de famille") and single (“chômeurs isolés") 
and three periods of unemployment. To each period corresponds a replacement rate, and period 
lengths are depending on the length of career before becoming unemployed. The first period of 
unemployment correspond to the highest replacement rate and the third period to a minimum benefit. 
Among the three unemployed categories, cohabiting with dependants and singles are more affected by 
the reform than cohabiting. Indeed, while cohabiting faced already before the reform a reduction over 
time of their unemployment benefits (through the third period of unemployment), the two other 
categories never entered the third period, which means that they benefited from an unlimited second 
period of unemployment without digressive unemployment benefit. The reform introduces the third 
period of unemployment for all unemployed categories and reduces lengths of the first and second 
periods. The impact of this reform is therefore less important for the cohabiting than for cohabiting 
with dependants and singles: while the former face only a faster reduction in time of their 
unemployment benefits than before, the latter two now face a reduction over time of their 
unemployment benefits, decreasing towards a lump sum benefit in third period.  
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3. Simulating the impact of social security reform: a tale of many models 
The above-described pension reform has an impact on the sustainability of the pension system. But it 
also might affect the adequacy of pensions, since the two aspects are two sides of the same coin. The 
assessment of sustainability may therefore not be very meaningful without considering current or 
prospective developments in adequacy, and vice versa. A previous study made an assessment of 
pension adequacy consistent with the AWG-projections in an international comparative perspective 
(Dekkers et al., 2010). More recent work (De Vil et al., 2010; Dekkers et al, 2012, Study Committee 
for Ageing, 2012, and this paper) apply a semi-aggregate model and a dynamic microsimulation model 
in simulating the impact of pension reform, thereby jointly assessing the budgetary consequences as 
well as the impacts on poverty and income inequality among the elderly in Belgium. 
The model used for the assessment of the budgetary consequences of ageing and pension reform is 
MALTESE
8
 (Model for Analysis of Long‐Term Evolution of Social Expenditure). This is a 
composition of interdependent semi-aggregate models, around one central model. The global 
accounting frame of the system relies on the national accounts. The various models are accounting 
models designed for translating demographic projections into budgetary developments like social 
security account and overall public finance account. Special attention is paid to modelling social 
expenses according to the calculation rules (legislation), often by scheme, gender, age and categories 
for the number of beneficiaries (new and other) and the corresponding average benefits. The latter 
takes into account ceilings, minimum rules, indexation rules, et cetera. 
The adequacy of pensions is assessed through the dynamic microsimulation model MIDAS (an 
acronym for ‘Microsimulation for the Development of Adequacy and Sustainability’). Technically 
speaking, MIDAS is a dynamic population model with dynamic cross-sectional ageing. Starting from 
a cross-sectional dataset representing a population of all ages at a certain point in time, the model 
simulates the life spans of individuals in the dataset, including with their interactions, for the years 
between 2002 and 2060. The latest version of the model used here, is being developed, tested and 
validated on a dataset of 300,000 individuals. The actual simulation runs are based on an expanded 
version of this dataset, being 2.2 million individuals or one-fifth of the Belgian population (De Menten 
et al., 2012).  
Summarizing, where macro simulation considers averages, a micro simulation model attempts to take 
into account the heterogeneity behind the average. This allows for capturing the complex and often 
nonlinear interactions of government policies with the distribution of individuals and households.  
Now a joint assessment on the basis of both models requires that they are capable to produce 
consistent simulations. MIDAS has an extensive alignment procedure, which allows it to be consistent 
with exogenous semi-aggregate projections and assumptions; in this case separating gender- and age-
groups as produced by the MALTESE model. The methodology used is known as “alignment by 
sorting” (Li, 2011, Chapter 4). This procedure separates the a priori risk of being in a state for an 
individual from the proportion of states over all individuals. At first, individuals are ranked according 
to their risk of being observed in the designated state. Next, the alignment procedure takes the first x%, 
                                                          
8  This discussion is based on section 2.2.3. of Dekkers et al. (2010b), and Fasquelle et al. (2012) 
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where x is an exogenous deterministic mortality rate, and marks them in that state. This alignment 
procedure is one ‘channel of consistency’ between the microsimulation model MIDAS and the semi-
aggregate model MALTESE. The other three channels are the demographic projection, the 
development of wages, and the use of common social policy hypothesis. All the channels are shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
A first input – and a first channel of consistency- pertains to demographic information. Starting from a 
detailed population database, the population projection rests on three demographic assumptions: the 
fertility rate, the life expectancy and the migration (see Table 1 which illustrates the main assumptions 
of the long-term base scenario). The resulting population numbers are a starting point in MALTESE 
(cf. infra). Furthermore, the fertility and mortality probabilities are the point of departure of the 
alignment procedures in MIDAS
9
. 
After having projected the participation rates and the labour force by a cohort approach, the 
macroeconomic scenario is then elaborated using the structural model S3BE (‘Small Supply-Side 
model for the Belgian Economy’). Assuming a CES production function with labour and capital as 
inputs, labour‐augmenting technical progress and constant returns to scale, past trends in labour 
market efficiency gains are used to compute the evolution of the structural unemployment rate. Next, 
                                                          
9  In its current version, MIDAS does not yet simulate immigration or emigration. 
Semi-aggregate 
accounting model
MALTESE
Dynamic micro 
simulation model
MIDAS
macro
S3BE
Demographic
projections
Joint social 
hypothesis
Social security category 
Alignment (gender, age)
Labour market state
Alignment (gender, age)
Earnings growth rate 
(gender)
Macroeconomic key 
variables
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given the unemployment rate trajectory, the development in the labour force and an assumed total 
factor productivity growth, employment and GDP are determined simultaneously (Lebrun, 2009). 
These are inputs for the MALTESE model. It is also the second channel of consistency between 
MIDAS and MALTESE. MALTESE uses the exogenous productivity development to simulate 
earnings growth. MIDAS uprates the earnings on the micro-level in such a way that the productivity 
growth rates used in MALTESE are replicated for men and women separately. As a result, both 
MALTESE and MIDAS adopt the actual development of wages between 2002 and 2011, and the mid-
term projections 2012-2017 of the Federal Planning Bureau (2012). For the years up to 2018, the joint 
assumption is that the average wage growth rate converges gradually to its long-term level, which is 
1.5% p.a. (see Table 1).  
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Table 1 Main assumptions  
Demographic assumptions (« Population projection 2011-2060 ») 
 2011 2030 2060 
Fertility rate 1,84 1,86 1,86 
Life expectancy at birth : men 78,2 81,9 86,2 
Life expectancy at birth : women 83,4 85,8 88,8 
Net migration flow in thousands 63,0 23,4 31,9 
Socio-economic assumptions 
Education rate Maintained at the level of the most recent observations for 
those under 15 or function of the evolution of the participation 
rate of those 15 and older 
Participation rate and transition from 
active status to disability, 
unemployment with company 
allowance (UCA) and retirement 
Modelling which applies to the successive generations 
probabilities of transition from one socioeconomic category to 
another, by gender and age group, and taking into account the 
effects of the already approved reforms 
Macroeconomic assumptions 
Mid-term Long-term base scenario 
Following the « Economic Forecasts 
2012-2017 » of the FPB where: 
Productivity growth between 2011 
and 2017 : 0,8% per year 
Unemployment rate in 2017 : 11,9% 
Employment rate in 2017 : 65,4% 
 
 
Productivity growth     1,50% 
Structural long term unemployment rate      8,0% 
Social policy assumptions 
2011-2012 :  
Existing legislation (measures of the 
social partners and the government) 
 
2013-2014 : 
Governmental agreement of 
December 2011 
From 2015 
Wage ceiling 
Minimum claim per working year 
1,25% 
Non flat rates (general scheme) 0,50% 
Flat rates and minima 1,00% 
  
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
 
As already said, MALTESE model uses a cohort approach to split the given population projection into 
the school population, the labour force, the disabled persons and the others (as a residual), by gender 
and age. This is based on transition probabilities, behaviour in recent years and includes impacts of 
reforms
10
. Based on this data, the population is then further subdivided to labour market states 
(employment by schemes, unemployment, full-time career breaks, CELS/UCA) and inactive states 
                                                          
10  See Fasquelle et al. (2012) for a detailed discussion. 
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such as retirement, and this specific for age and gender categories. Through the aforementioned 
alignment techniques, the microsimulation model MIDAS replicates these tables, to age and gender. 
Finally, a fourth channel of consistency between the two models is introduced via the use of common 
social policy hypothesis on the intertemporal development of social security benefits and the various 
parameters, minimum benefits, floors and ceilings (see Table 1). See a.o. Dekkers et al. (2012) and De 
Vil et al. (2010) for a more extensive discussion.  
Even though much effort has been put in the consistency between the two models, some differences 
remain that are fundamental to the two models. These differences pertain to the level of modelling and 
the start datasets of the two models. The semi-aggregate model MALTESE is based on a variety of 
meso- and macro-level data, including national accounts data. The microsimulation model, on the 
other hand, starts from a representative administrative sample of 300,000 actual individuals and their 
households, which is then extended using the sample weight to a sample of about 2.2 million 
individuals in 2001. Thus, especially in the short- and middle- term, where simulation results are to 
some extent the result of retrospective information, the observed trends may differ. 
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4. The budgetary impact of the structural reforms 
This section presents the budgetary impact of the recent pension reform (including the early retirement 
reform) and the impact of other, simultaneously decided, restrictive measures with regard to 
unemployment benefits and access conditions for career breaks and time credit. The tables in this 
section illustrate, on the one hand, the evolution of the base projection which includes the structural 
reforms and, on the other hand, the impact of those reforms by comparing the base projection with a 
projection without reform. Besides the impact on social expenditure, the reforms also affect the labour 
market and the macroeconomic indicators. 
4.1. Labour market and macroeconomic environment 
Without the reform, the labour market hypotheses imply a context of increasing participation and 
employment rates in the projection. The structural reforms reinforce this favourable development in 
the long run: compared to a situation without reform, the global participation rate is raised by 1 
percentage point and the participation rate of the age category 55-64 increase by 6.2 percentage points 
by 2060 (Table 2).  In the base projection (including the reforms), the global participation rate and the 
participation rate of older workers/reach 74.5% and 64.9%, respectively, in 2060. 
Table 2 Labour market: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural reforms 
(difference between projection with and without reform in percentage point) – 
Administrative definition 
 
Base scenario (with 
reforms) 
Impact of reforms 
 2011 2030 2060 2030 2060 
Participation rate (labour force
a
 in % of population 15-
64 years) 
72.7 74.2 74.5 1.0 1.0 
15-54 years 76.5 75.6 75.6 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 52.9 64.0 64.9 5.8 6.2 
Employment rate (total employment in % of population 
15-64 years) 
64.0 68.0 68.5 0.9 1.0 
15-54 years 68.3 70.0 70.2 -0.2 -0.1 
55-64 years 42.0 55.1 56.3 5.2 5.6 
Unemployment rate (unemployment in % of labour 
force
a
) 
11.9 8.5 8.0 0.1 0.0 
CELS/UCA rate (% of potential labour force
b
 50-64 
years) 
8.0 5.9 5.6 -1.5 -1.5 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. labour force = total employment + unemployment. 
b. potential labour force = labour force + CELS/UCA + full-time career breaks and time-credit. 
Assuming that the reforms do not affect the structural unemployment rate (8%), employment should, 
in the long run, have a similar evolution as the labour force. Compared to a scenario without reform, 
the global employment rate is raised by 1 percentage point and the employment rate of the age 
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category 55-64 by 5.6 percentage points by 2060. In the reference simulation, the global employment 
rate and the employment rate of those aged 55-64 amount to 68.5% and 56.3%, respectively. 
Table 1 shows that annual labour productivity growth amounts to 1.5% in the long run in the base 
scenario (from about 2030 on). However, Table 3 shows that, over the period 2011-2060, productivity 
gains only add up to 1.3% annually on average as a result of a weaker productivity growth in the short 
to medium term. Between 2011 and 2060, GDP grows by 1.7% per year on average and employment 
by 0.3% per year (see Table 3). 
Table 3 Macroeconomic projection: base scenario (with reform) and impact of the structural 
reforms (difference between projection with and without reform in % 
 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of the reforms 
 Average annual growth rates in real terms in % Level in % 
 2011-
2030 
2030-
2060 
2011-
2060 
2011-2030 2030-2060 2011-2060 2030 2060 
GDP 1.6 1.7 1.7 O.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Productivity 1.1 1.5 1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Employment 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.07 0.00 0.03 1.3 1.4 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee for Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
In the long term, employment growth owing to structural reforms implies an economic growth which 
is slightly higher than in a scenario without reform: 0.03% annually over the period 2011-2060 (see 
Table 3). In 2060, GDP should be 1.4% higher than in a scenario without reform. 
4.2. Social expenditures 
The next table presents the budgetary cost of ageing, or the variation of the whole social expenses 
expressed in percent of GDP between two years, firstly for the base scenario which includes the 
reforms (in the left side of the table). In the base-scenario, the social expenses would rise from 25.3% 
of GDP in 2011 to 31.4% of GDP in 2060, or a budgetary cost of ageing of 6.1 percentage points of 
GDP between 2011 and 2060. The costs of pensions and health care would increase by 7.6 percentage 
points of GDP, but the other expenditures (especially unemployment benefits and children benefits) 
would decrease by 1.5 percentage points of GDP.  
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Table 4 Budgetary costs of ageing: base scenario of the Study Committee of Ageing (with 
reform) and impact of the reforms (difference between projection with and without 
reform), October 2012 
% of GDP 
Components of the budgetary 
costs 
Base scenario (with reforms) Impact of reforms 
2011 2030 2060 2011-2060 2011-2030 2011-2060 
Pensions 9.9 13.6 14.5 4.6 -0.2 -0.1 
- wage-earners 5.4 7.6 7.8 2.5 -0.2 -0.1 
- self-employed 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
- civil servants 3.7 5.0 5.6 1.8 -0.1 0.1 
Health Care
a
 8.0 9.4 11.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 
Disability schemes 1.6 1.6 1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Unemployment
b
 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 
CELS/UCA 0.4 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
Children benefits 1.6 1.6 1.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Other social expenditures 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Total 25.3 29.5 31.4 6.1 -0.5 -0.3 
Source: High Council of Finance, Study Committee of Ageing, Yearly Report 2012 
a. Public expenditure, inclusive long-term care. 
b. Inclusive time credit and career breaks  
The impact of the structural reforms on the budgetary costs of ageing is further discussed by 
comparing the budgetary costs of ageing in percent of GDP including and excluding reform (the right 
side of Table 4). The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 
percentage point of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed between pensions, 
unemployment and CELS/UCA. Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased 
GDP that results from the reform of course decreases the weight of the social expenses in percent of 
GDP.  
4.2.1. Unemployment, career break and conventional early leavers’ scheme 
The average benefit level of the CELS/UCA is unaffected by the reform. The decrease in the expenses 
due to the reform therefore comes from the reduction of the number of CELS/UCA beneficiaries: in 
2060, almost 22 000 people, or 18% of the number of beneficiaries without reform, do not have access 
to this regime anymore, be it temporarily of definitively. Expenditure for unemployment and career 
breaks should also drop by 0.1 percentage point of GDP. This decrease results from, on the one hand, 
more strict access conditions for career breaks which lower the number of eligible persons, and, on the 
other, a decrease of average benefits due to the more outspoken decrease of the unemployment benefit 
with increased duration of the unemployment spell, and to the raised eligibility age for a seniority 
supplement. 
4.2.2. Pension schemes 
Table 4 shows that the impact of the reform reduces pension expenses by 0.1 percentage point GDP 
between 2011 and 2060 only. Of course, the reform translates into a decrease in the number of 
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pensioners (almost 66 000 people in 2060 or 1.7% of the total number of pensioners) which reduces 
pension expenditures in terms of GDP. Inversely, however, these expenditures themselves are 
increased by higher average pension benefits.  
The results in Table 4 are expressed in % of GDP. As the latter increases as a result of the reform, the 
budgetary impact is cet. par. reduced. To keep this effect out of the discussion, the percentages 
expressed in the below sections are based on the expenditure amounts in euro in the scenarios with and 
without reform. 
During the transition period, expenditure reductions are realized in the three pension schemes by a 
drop in the number of retirements, as career and age conditions are raised progressively until 2016. 
Civil servants are to postpone their retirement for a relatively longer period since, contrary to wage 
earners and the self-employed, they previously were not subject to a condition for early retirement. 
When the people who initially had to postpone their retirement actually will retire, they will receive a 
higher average pension benefit, mainly because of a longer career compared to the situation before the 
reform. The extent to which the average pension increases and whether these two effects cancel each 
other out, differs between schemes. On the whole, expenditures in the wage earners’ scheme, are 
reduced. But in the self-employed scheme and especially the public sector, expenditures grow 
compared to a scenario without reform. 
a. Wage earners’ scheme 
In the wage earners’ scheme, the increase of average pensions – as a result of longer careers – amply 
compensates for the negative impact of the less favourable valuation of certain equivalent periods. 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that the modalities of the current pension bonus
11
 are maintained until the 
end of the projection period leads to a higher bonus and, thus, to a higher average pension. The 
government has already announced a pension bonus reform to tune it to the pension reform, thereby 
only granting a bonus if the career condition for early retirement is met and work is continued. 
b. Self-employed scheme 
In the self-employed scheme, the increase of average pensions should more than compensate for the 
savings which result from the smaller number of pensioners, owing to longer careers and a higher 
pension bonus (see also wage earners’ scheme) in the longer term, and lead to additional expenditure. 
Particularly in the self-employed scheme, career extension leads to a higher number of, mainly female, 
pensioners who meet the conditions for a minimum pension, which in its turn raises the average 
pension. Moreover, the increased flexibility of the penalty system contributes to higher average 
pensions for new pensioners. By 2060, pension expenditure for the self-employed should be 0.5% 
higher than in a scenario without reform. But, when expressed in percentage of GDP as shown in 
Table 4, this increase is cancelled out. 
                                                          
11  A pension bonus of € 2.2 (prices on 1/2/2012) per day of actual service is granted to wage earners and self-employed which 
continue to work after the age of 62 or after a career of at least 44 years. According to the law, the bonus entered into effect 
on 1/1/2007 and ends on 1/12/2013. 
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c. Civil servants’ scheme 
Additional expenditure by the year 2060 is also projected in the civil servants’ scheme: 3.7% more 
than in a scenario without reform, or 0.1 percent point if the increase of GDP is taken into account. 
Compared to wage earners or the self-employed, civil servants are to postpone their retirement for a 
longer period because of insufficient career years. This career extension leads to a higher average 
pension. Moreover, as a result of retirement at a higher age, more pensioners benefit from a (higher) 
age supplement
12
. Granting this age supplement is responsible for almost 50% of the additional 
expenditure compared to a scenario without reform. The government has already announced an age 
supplement reform. 
5. The social impact of reform 
This section starts with a caveat must be discussed. The below figures show the impact of pension 
reform on pensioners and of unemployment reform on the unemployed. The change of a benefit 
however affects the equivalent household income of the household of the beneficiary and therefore 
changes the poverty risk of all the members of the household. As Figures 2 and 3 shows the impact of 
reform for pensioners, and Figure 5 shows the impact of unemployment reform for unemployed, both 
figures ignore the indirect impact on non-beneficiaries. We have however chosen to limit the 
discussion to beneficiaries in order to visualize the impact of the reform measures. 
5.1. Impact of pension reform on the poverty risk of the pensioners 
This recent social security reform is mainly a pension reform. This section will therefore analyse the 
impact of this reform on the adequacy of pensions first. The main indicator analysed is the risk of 
poverty rate of retirees. The global impact of the reform can be seen in Figure 2. The risk of poverty 
rate of retirees decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the reduction reaches 4 
percentage points. The progressivity of this reduction indicates that the impact of this reform on 
poverty operates mainly in the long run.  
                                                          
12  Since 1/1/2001, an age supplement is granted to civil servants who continue their career after the age of 60. The age 
supplement increases with the age and amounts to 1.5% of the pension for retirement at 61, running up to 9% of the pension 
for retirement at 65. 
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Figure 3 presents the impact of the reform on the poverty of retirees differentiated by gender. For men, 
the decrease of poverty rate appears immediately after the introduction of the reform. With more 
restricted eligibility conditions for early retirement, individuals are invited to postpone retirement. 
Consequently, as career length increases, retirement benefits increase as well.  
In 2060, the poverty rate reduction of retirees reach almost 4 percentage points for men and almost 5 
percentage points for women. Even if, in absolute terms, this decrease is slightly higher for women, 
when we consider the variation of poverty in relative terms, the decrease is largely more important for 
men (-50%) than for women (-30%). 
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that the reduction of the poverty risk as a result of the reform sets off 
almost a decade later for women than for men.  
Figure 2: Risk of poverty rate of retirees – Comparison between a scenario with structural 
reforms and a scenario without structural reforms, in percent 
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Figure 4 allows better understanding the various impacts of the pension reform. This figure presents 
on one hand the evolution of the average retirement benefit by gender and on the other hand the 
evolution of the average equivalent income of pensioners by gender. The differences observed in the 
right pane of Figure 4 obviously results from single men and women pensioners, as well as from 
pensioners whose partner is not retired. The comparison of these two figures allows, in addition to 
explaining the evolution of poverty rates, understanding the role of household composition and income 
composition into households. In stark contradiction to men, both the average retirement benefit and the 
average equivalent income decrease for women in years following the introduction of the reform. 
Even if this reform incites people to work more, wage-earners and self-employed who were not 
eligible for early retirement before the reform are by definition not impacted by the reform, since this 
makes the conditions for early retirement more strict. They therefore continue to work, as in the 
situation without the reform, until the normal retirement age of 65. Women are proportionally 
overrepresented in this group. Therefore, during the years directly following the introduction of the 
reform and compared to the situation without reform, as only women with longer careers are forced to 
postpone their retirement as a result of the reform, those women wage-earners and self-employed who 
do enter retirement at 65are mainly those with short careers. This overrepresentation leads to lower 
retirement benefits for newly retired women in the reform scenario and in the short run.  
Figure 3 : Risk of poverty rate of retirees by gender – Comparison between a scenario with structural reforms and a 
scenario without structural reforms, in percent 
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The selection effect in the short run where mainly women with a short career remain unaffected by the 
reform whereas others postpone retirement results in the somewhat paradoxal situation that the 
average career length of women decreases while their average age at retirement increases. This 
negatively affects the average net retirement benefit of women pensioners, and thus reduces the 
equivalent income of retired women. 
For men of various subsequent cohorts, the distribution of the length of the career is more or less 
stable and high. Thus the number of men entering in retirement from being in work each year will be 
lower as a result of the reform. For women, on the contrary, the average length of the career is 
currently considerably lower and expected to increase with time. As a result, the reform will prevent 
many women to enter into retirement in the short run. Those small numbers of women that will retire, 
will have careers short enough not to be affected by the reform. When the women affected by the 
reform will finally become eligible for retirement, there will be a catching-up and many women will 
enter retirement in a relatively short time span, having a considerably longer career than their 
predecessors. The reform therefore has a stronger impact on women than on men. 
5.2. The impact of unemployment reform on the poverty risk of the 
unemployed 
Figure 5 compares the poverty risk among unemployed in the reform scenario with the non-reform 
scenario. Before proceeding, a caveat must be highlighted. In the current version of MIDAS, the 
income from savings, capital or occupational pension systems are not taken into account. As a result, 
the poverty threshold of 60% of median equivalent income is lower than the SILC poverty line. This 
reveals itself specifically in a considerably lower poverty risk among the unemployed in the model 
than resulting from the SILC data. In order to approach the actual poverty risk and therefore to be able 
to capture the impact of the reform of the unemployment system, the below results are based on a 
poverty threshold equal to 70% of the median equivalent income. 
Figure 4 : Variation of the average net retirement benefits of pensioners, by gender (on the left) and variation of the 
average  net equivalent income of pensioners, by gender (on the right), in percent.  
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Figure 5 hence shows the impact of reform of the unemployment system on the unemployed and 
immediately shows that the poverty risk increases as a result of the reform, an impact which is more 
important for men than for women.  
 
To understand this difference in impact, one must recall the differences in reform for various 
categories of beneficiaries, as well as how men and women are distributed among these categories. 
There are 3 types of unemployed: those that are living with dependent household members, those that 
are living with not-dependent household members and single unemployed. Of these three categories, 
the first and the last are particularly affected by the reform of the unemployment system. The poverty 
risk of the unemployed with dependent household members and single unemployed therefore increases 
considerably, whereas the impact of reform is limited for the unemployed living with non-dependent 
household members. Another reason for this impact is that, almost by definition, the latter category of 
unemployed benefits from the (unchanged) contributions of the non-dependent household members to 
the equivalent income of the household, which is not the case for the other two categories of 
unemployed. 
Now official statistics from the National Employment Office (Office national de l’emploi ONEM) 
show that men are overrepresented among the unemployed that live with dependent-household 
members and among the single unemployed. Women, on the other hand, are overrepresented among 
the unemployed living with non-dependent household members. As a result, Figure 5 shows that the 
reform of the unemployment system has a more important impact on male unemployed compared to 
female unemployed. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the impact of recent reform of the pension system, including the conventional 
early leavers’ scheme, the general unemployment scheme on the development of sustainability as well 
as adequacy in Belgium. The impact analysis follows earlier work by Dekkers, Desmet and Inagaki 
(2012) in demonstrating how two separate yet consistent models can be used in unison to assess the 
budgetary impact and the adequacy impact of social security reform. 
Figure 1 : Risk of poverty rate of unemployed computed at 70% of the equivalent income, by gender (men on the left 
and women on the right)   
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The structural reforms of December 2011 reduce the budgetary cost of ageing by 0.3 percentage point 
of GDP between 2011 and 2060, evenly distributed between pensions, unemployment and 
CELS/UCA. Besides the direct impact of the measures themselves, the increased GDP that results 
from the reform of course decreases the weight of the social expenses in percent of GDP.  
The risk of poverty rate of retirees decreases progressively as a result of the reform. In 2060, the 
reduction reaches 4 percentage points (4 percentage points for the men and 5 percentage points for the 
women) Furthermore, the poverty risk of especially male unemployed increases considerably. 
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